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Abstract This paper investigates the allocative efficiency of two non-price
allocation mechanisms – the lottery (random allocation) and the waiting-line auc-
tion (queue system) – for the cases where consumers possess identical time costs
(the homogeneous case), and where time costs are correlated with time valuations
(the heterogeneous case). We show that the relative efficiency of the two mecha-
nisms depends critically on a scarcity factor (measured by the ratio of the number of
objects available for allocation over the number of participants) and on the shape of
the distribution of valuations. We show that the lottery dominates the waiting-line
auction for a wide range of situations, and that while consumer heterogeneity may
improve the relative allocative efficiency of the waiting-line auction, the ranking
on relative efficiency is not reversed.
1 Introduction
Governments often play a key role in the allocation of goods and services when
prices are set below market clearing levels. Two commonly-used mechanisms are
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the lottery and the waiting-line auction (i.e. first-served queue system).1 Lotteries
have been used widely to allocate hunting permits, fishing berths, oil drill leases,
or even admission to universities, while waiting line auctions have been used to
allocate publicly-provided goods and services such as medical care services or
subsidized public housing.
In selecting an allocation mechanism, one must consider its equity and efﬁ-
ciency. The equity of a mechanism is measured by the welfare impact of the allo-
cation. The case for choosing the lottery to allocate goods and burdens (e.g. military
draft) is frequently made on the grounds of horizontal equity, i.e. individuals who
possess the same relevant characteristics should be treated equally [see Eckhoff
(1989); Elster (1991); Goodwin (1992); Boyce (1994)]. The efﬁciency of a mech-
anism is measured by the degree of rent dissipation, due to resource misallocation
and the incurrence of rent seeking costs. In a waiting-line auction, individuals who
queued up earlier may be the ones with lower opportunity cost of time rather than
the ones with higher valuations, while in the case of the lottery, individuals who
value the objects most may not receive an allocation.2 There are no rent-seeking
costs in a lottery, but waiting in line creates both disutility and potential loss of
income.
In this paper, we study the allocative efficiency of the lottery versus the waiting-
line auction, when individuals possess identical time costs (the homogeneous case),
and when time costs are correlated with time valuations (the heterogeneous case).
For the homogeneous case, our results generalize those in Taylor et al. (2003).3
There are two key findings in this paper. Firstly, relative efficiency is critically
dependent on the shape of the distribution of time valuations and a scarcity factor
(measured by the ratio of number of objects over number of participants); secondly,
the lottery is almost always more efficient than the waiting-line auction unless there
are very few objects to be allocated (i.e. high scarcity) and there are only a few
participants possessing high values (i.e. the distribution of time valuations is L-
shaped). For the heterogeneous case, we study a model where time costs and time
valuations are correlated. When there is a positive (negative) correlation, the rel-
ative efficiency of the waiting-line auction improves (declines). However, the the
ranking of allocative efficiency vis-a-vis the lottery is unchanged.4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model.
Section 3 analyzes the relative allocative efficiency for the case of homogenous
consumers under different distributional assumptions for time valuations. Section 4
extends the analysis to the case of heterogenous consumers. Section 5 concludes
the paper.
2 The model
There are m identical and objects to be distributed freely to n(>m) individuals,
at most one object per person, using either a lottery or a waiting-line auction. The
1 Another allocation mechanism is by merit, according to a set of pre-determined criteria.
2 Studies on the economics of rationing and the queue system have been carried out by Tobin
(1952); Nichols et al. (1971); Barzel (1974); Suen (1989).
3 Using numerical analysis, they considered the local impact of mean-preserving dispersions
in valuations on relative allocative efficiency.
4 These results are related to the analysis in Sah (1987), which concluded that the sufficiently
poor would always prefer non-convertible rations (i.e. a lottery) to queuing.
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opportunity costs of time of the n individuals (measured by their wage rates) are
denoted by w1, w2, . . . , wn , and their monetary valuations (measured in dollars)
are denoted by v1, v2, . . . , vn . Thus, the ratio yi = vi/wi describes an individual’s
valuation of an object measured in time units. We refer to vi as monetary valuation
and yi as time valuation. In our analysis, it is often more convenient to work with
time valuations.
Individuals are risk neutral; they know their own valuations and time costs,
but not those of others. Each individual has identical subjective beliefs about the
possible monetary valuations and time costs of other individuals. Specifically, each
individual believes that the monetary valuations and time costs for the n − 1 rival
claimants are independent realizations of a pair of continuous random variables
{V, W } having a joint distribution function F(v,w) with support [v, v] × [w,w],
for some finite non-negative v and positive w. The marginal distributions of V
and W are denoted by FV (v) and FW (w), respectively. Similarly, the marginal
distribution of Y is denoted by FY (y).
The efficiency of an allocation mechanism is measured by the expected social
surplus, defined as the sum of the expected payoffs for all n consumers.
2.1 Lottery
At a pre-specified time, m individuals are randomly chosen and allocated an object.
The probability that the ith individual obtains an object is
H R = m
n
.
If the ith individual has a monetary valuation of vi , his monetary payoff is
π R(vi ) = vi H R = mvi
n
.
Given the symmetric treatment of all individuals, the expected social surplus is
SR = nE[π R(V )] = mE(V ). (1)
Hence, the expected social surplus generated by a lottery depends only on the
number of objects and the mean value of the distribution of monetary valuations.
2.2 Waiting-line auction
In a waiting-line auction, objects are allocated at a pre-specified time and location,
on a first-come-first-served basis . Following Holt and Sherman (1982), we con-
sider an individual’s decision whether to join the queue, conditional on an expected
waiting time. Each individual occupies only one position in the queue. Individuals
who arrive after the mth person will be notified so that no unsuccessful persons will
spend time in the queue.5 The time taken to reach the queue is negligible compared
with the waiting time.
5 Holt and Sherman (1982) shows that if unsuccessful individuals also have to wait, individuals
will optimally reduce their waiting time. In equilibrium, expected waiting time as well as payoff
remains unchanged.
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The equilibrium queuing time. For each individual i , there is an optimal queu-
ing time τ(yi ), which is a strictly increasing function of time valuation yi . Under
the assumption that τ(y) is differentiable, τ(y) can be written as
τ(y) = 1
H QY (y)
y∫
y
xhQY (x)dx = y −
1
H QY (y)
y∫
y
H QY (x)dx (2)
where hQY (y) and H
Q
Y (y) are, respectively, the density function and the distribution
function of the mth largest order-statistic among the n −1 independent draws from
the distribution of time valuations.6 Denoting the marginal distribution of Y by
FY (y), we can verify that
H QY (y) =
n−1∑
k = n−m
(
n − 1
k
)
[FY (y)]k [1 − FY (y)]n−k−1 .
It is straightforward to verify that the optimal waiting time τ(vi ) is a decreasing
function in m and an increasing function in n. As shown in Holt and Sherman
(1982), if the arrival time at the queue is chosen according to τ(y), expected payoff
will be globally maximized. The probability that individual i will receive an object
is simply H QY (yi ).
The equilibrium expected payoff. The expected payoff, in time units is
π Q(yi ) = (yi − τ(yi ))H Q(yi ) =
yi∫
y
H QY (x)dx
for individual i. Multiplying π Q(yi ) by the time cost wi yields the expected mon-
etary payoff. The expected social surplus generated is
SQ = nE

W
Y∫
y
H QY (x)dx

 . (3)
Note that SQ depends on the joint distribution of time valuation Y and time cost
W . To compare allocative efficiency, we must specify the joint distribution of Y
and W , in order to derive closed-form expressions for SR and SQ , and compute
the ratio SR/SQ .
3 Efficiency comparison: homogeneous consumers
When individuals have identical time costs (i.e. wi =wc, i = 1, · · · , n), the ex-
pected social surplus of a waiting-line auction can be expressed in terms of
6 The second part of the equation follows from integration by parts.
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V = Ywc,
SQ = nE


V∫
v
H QV (x)dx

 ,
where,
H QV (v) =
n−1∑
k = n−k
(
n − 1
k
)
[FV (v)]k [1 − FV (v)]n−k−1
By switching the order of integrations and then the order of integration and sum-
mation,
SQ = n
v∫
v


v∫
v
H QV (x)dx

 fV (v)dv
= n
v∫
v


v∫
x
fV (v)dv

 H QV (x)dx
= n
v∫
v
[1 − FV (v)]H QV (v)dv
= n
n−1∑
k = n−m
(
n − 1
k
) v∫
v
FV (v)k[1 − FV (v)]n−kdv (4)
Thus, SQ depends on the number of objects to be allocated m, the number of
individuals n, and the distribution of monetary valuations FV (v).
When time costs are homogeneous, resource misallocation does not occur in a
waiting-line auction; inefficiency results from the rent-seeking costs of waiting in
line. As noted earlier, rent dissipation in a lottery is due solely to resource misal-
location. Hence, the lottery is more (less) efficient than the waiting-line auction if
resource misallocation in the lottery is smaller (larger) than the rent-seeking costs
incurred in a waiting-line auction.
To analyze the relative efficiency of the two allocation mechanisms, four clas-
ses of distributions for V are considered: power function, Weibull, logistic and
beta.7 We summarize the technical results in the lemmas (with proofs provided in
the Appendix) and focus our discussion on the corresponding Propositions.
7 These four classes cover the broad range of distributional forms: L-shaped (the majority have
very low valuations and a few have very high valuations), U -shaped (the majority have either
very high or very low valuations), J -shaped (the majority have high valuations and a few have
low valuations), flat and unimodal, (the majority have valuations in the middle, with a few having
low or high valuations), etc.
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Fig. 1 Plots of pdf of power function distribution: θ = 1.0
3.1 Monetary valuation with the power function distribution
The cumulative distribution function (cdf) takes the following form8:
F(v; θ, β) =
(v
θ
)β
, 0 < v < θ; θ > 0, β > 0, (5)
where β determines the shape of the distribution and θ controls the range or scale
of the V values. The probability density function (pdf) is decreasing (L-shaped)
when β < 1, constant (uniform) when β = 1, and increasing (J -shaped) when
β > 1. Figure 1 illustrates these cases. The mean and variance of the distribution
are E(V ) = θβ
β+1 and Var(V ) = θ
2β
(β+2)(β+1)2 , respectively.
Lemma 1 If monetary valuations are drawn from the power function distribu-
tion, the expected social surplus functions are SR = mθβ/(β + 1) and SQ =
SRh(β, n,m), where
h(β, n,m) = n
m
− n! (βn + m + 1)(n − m +
1
β
)
βm(n − m − 1)!(n + 1 + 1
β
)
, (6)
with (·) being the gamma function. Furthermore, h(β, n,m) satisﬁes: (i) it is
strictly increasing in m, decreasing in n, and decreasing in β; (ii) h(1, n,m) =
m+1
n+1 ; (iii) h( 12 , n,m) = 3mn+3n+2−2m
2
(n+1)(n+2) ; (iv) h(β, n, 1) = n(1+β)(1+nβ)(1+nβ−β) ; and
(v) limβ→∞ h(β, n,m) = 0.
Proposition 1 Suppose monetary valuations are drawn from the power function
distribution. For any given θ , m and n, the lottery is more efﬁcient that the wait-
ing-line auction when β ≥ 1. The degree of relative efﬁciency, as measured by
8 Taylor et al. (2003) considered the power function distribution with m = 1, and the beta
distribution with β = 1. As noted in Sect. 3.4, the latter is really a special case of the power
function distribution.
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h(β, n,m) increases as β increases. When β < 1, the lottery is still more efﬁ-
cient than the waiting-line auction provided the ratio m/n is sufﬁciently small (For
instance, we can show that h( 12 , n,m) ≤ 1 if m/n ≤ 12 ).
Two factors influence h(β, n,m): a scarcity factor and a distributional shape
factor. This scarcity factor is measured by the ratio m/n. Since h(β, n,m) and
τ(v) have opposite signs with respect to changes in m/n, relative efficiency of
the waiting-line auction improves (worsens) when the m/n ratio rises (falls). The
distributional shape factor is measured by the parameter β in the power function
distribution. When β < 1, the pdf is L-shaped, so that an individual in the wait-
ing-line auction is more likely to face mostly competitors with low valuations. As
β increases, the distribution of V shifts to the right; the likelihood of facing com-
petitors with higher valuations increases, leading to an increase in optimal waiting
time τ(v). This causes h(β, n,m) to fall in value, so that the relative efficiency of
the lottery over the waiting-line auction improves.
Proposition 1 indicates that when β ≥ 1, the lottery is always more efficient
than the waiting-line auction, regardless of the m/n ratio. For the case where β < 1,
when the expected social surplus is smaller and the rent-seeking costs (i.e. wait-
ing times) are lower, the waiting-line auction may be more efficient, if resource
misallocation incurred under the lottery is greater. Thus, when β < 1, the scarcity
factor m/n is critical in determining the relative efficiency of the two mechanisms.
As stated in Proposition 1, when β drops to 12 , the waiting-line auction will dom-
inate the lottery if m/n is greater than 12 . Otherwise, the lottery remains the more
efficient allocation mechanism. In general, if the change in the rent-seeking costs
is larger than the change in the expected surplus, the allocative efficiency of the
waiting-line auction deteriorates relative to the lottery.
3.2 Monetary valuation with the Weibull distribution
The Weibull distribution models valuation distributions that are (i) extremely pos-
itively-skewed, (ii) unimodal and positively-skewed, and (iii) nearly symmetric.
The cumulative distribution function of the Weibull distribution takes the form
F(v; θ, β) = 1 − exp
(
−
(v
θ
)β)
, v > 0; θ > 0, β > 0, (7)
where β is the shape parameter and θ is the scale parameter. When β < 1, the
density function is a decreasing function in v. When β > 1, the density function is
unimodal with a longer tail to the right.9 When β = 1, the Weibull distribution is
an exponential distribution. The mean and variance of a Weibull random variable
are, respectively, E(V ) = θ(1+ 1
β
) and Var(V ) = θ2[(1+ 2
β
)−[(1+ 1
β
)]2].
Figure 2 illustrates the density function of the Weibull distribution.
Lemma 2 If monetary valuations are drawn from the Weibull distribution, the
expected social surplus functions are given by SR = mθ(1 + 1/β) and SQ =
9 It can be shown that when β = 3.768, the density function of the Weibull distribution is
very similar to that of a normal distribution [See Hernandez and Johnson (1980)].
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Fig. 2 Plots of pdf of Weibull distribution: θ = 10.0
Fig. 3 Plots of SR/SQ versus β (left), and versus m for Weibull distribution
SRh(β, n,m), where,
h(β, n,m) = n
m
n−1∑
n−m
k∑
j = 0
(
n − 1
k
)(
k
j
)
(−1) j
(
1
n − k + j
)1/β
. (8)
Furthermore, h(β, n,m) is decreasing in β and h(1, n,m) = 1.
Proposition 2 Suppose monetary valuations are drawn from the Weibull distri-
bution. The lottery is more efﬁcient than the the waiting-line auction if β > 1;
the waiting-line dominates the lottery if β < 1; the two allocation mechanisms
are equally efﬁcient when β = 1, which represents the case where monetary
valuations follow an exponential distribution.
The above results indicate that when valuations are drawn from a Weibull dis-
tribution, the relative efficiency of the lottery over the waiting-line auction depends
only on the shape parameter β. The magnitude of relative efficiency still depends
on the scarcity factor m/n. We plot the relative efficiency of the lottery over the
waiting-line auction (i.e., SR/SQ = 1/h(β, n,m)) in Fig. 3. The numerical results
show that when the scarcity factor m/n ≈ 1, the difference in allocative efficiency
is small, so that it does not really matter which allocation mechanism is chosen.
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Fig. 4 Plots of pdf of logistic distribution: µ = 10.0
3.3 Monetary valuation with the logistic distribution
In a variety of economic settings, the distribution of valuations are best modelled as
symmetric and unimodal. The logistic distribution function serves this purpose.10
The cumulative distribution function of the logistic distribution has the following
form
F(v;µ, θ) = 1 − 1
1 + exp[(v − µ)/θ ] ,
−∞ < v < ∞; −∞ < µ < ∞, θ > 0. (9)
Note that the logistic distribution is symmetric around the mean E(V ) = µ with
variance Var(V ) = 13π2θ2. Note that µ is a location parameter and θ is the scale
parameter. The larger the value of θ , the flatter is the pdf. A few plots of the logistic
pdf are provided in Fig. 4 for illustrative purpose.11
Lemma 3 If monetary valuations are drawn from the logistic distribution, the
expected social surplus functions are
SR = mµ and SQ = nθ [(n) − (n − m)]
where (·) is the digamma function deﬁned as (z) = d log (z)/dz. Taking
µ/θ = 10,
SQ
SR
= n
10m
[(n) − (n − m)],
10 We chose the class of logistic distributions over the class normal distributions for our anal-
ysis, as the latter class of distributions does not allow us to derive closed-form expressions for
the expected surplus functions. With suitable choice of parameters, the logistic distribution may
approximate a normal distribution.
11 Note that the logistic distribution may assume negative values, which has no economic
meaning for the problem at hand, since an individual with a negative monetary valuation will not
choose to participate in either the lottery or the waiting-line auction. However, we can make the
probability of negative values negligible by having a large mean-to-scale ratio, i.e., µ/θ ≥ 10.
The probability of negative values is F(0, µ, θ) = 1 − 1/[1 + exp(−µ/θ)]. When µ/θ ≥ 10,
we have F(0, µθ) ≤ 4.5 × 10−5.
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which is an increasing function of m. We can show that maxm(SQ/SR) < 1 for
n < 10, 000.
Proposition 3 If monetary valuations are drawn from the logistic distribution with
anegligible probability of negative valuations (µ/θ ≥ 10), the lottery almost always
dominates the waiting-line auction.
The above result is particularly striking as it indicates that when time costs
are homogeneous and valuations can be modeled as a symmetric distribution, the
optimal allocation mechanism is almost always a lottery, regardless of the number
of objects to be allocated or the number of participants.
3.4 Monetary valuation with the beta distribution
The probability density function (pdf) of the beta distribution has the following
form
F(v;α, β) = (α + β)
(α)(β)
vα−1(1 − v)β−1, 0 ≤ v ≤ 1, α > 0, β > 0. (10)
In terms of the potential shapes of the density function, the beta distribution is the
richest family of distributions. It is U -shaped if α < 1 and β < 1, uniform if α = 1
and β = 1, L-shaped if α < 1 and β > 1, J -shaped if α > 1 and β < 1, and
unimodal, otherwise. Furthermore, when β = 1, the beta distribution becomes a
special case of the power function distribution. The mean and variance of the beta
distribution are E(V ) = α
α+β and Var(V ) = αβ(α+β)2(α+β+1) , respectively. We
provide plots of the beta pdf in Fig. 5.
There are no closed-form functions of SR and SQ , since the cdf of the beta dis-
tribution does not have a closed-form expression. We consider two special cases -
when α = 1 and when β = 1 - which allow us to obtain closed-form expression
of the ratio SR/SQ , as well as compute the values of the ratio SR/SQ [using the
general expression given in (4)] for a range of parameter configurations of β, n and
m. These results are presented in Fig. 6.
When β = 1, the cdf is a power function distribution; hence, the Lemma 1
applies. We can infer that when β = 1, the lottery is more efficient than the wait-
ing-line auction if α ≥ 1, and if α < 1 it continues to dominate the waiting-line
auction provided that m/n is sufficiently small. Similarly, for β > 1, the lottery
remains the more efficient allocation mechanism. For the second special case when
α = 1, we first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4 If monetary valuations are drawn from the beta distribution andα = 1,
the expected social surplus functions are SR =m/(1+β) and SQ = SRh(β, n,m),
where
h(β, n,m) = n!(m + 1 + 1/β)
m!(n + 1 + 1/β) . (11)
Furthermore, h(β, n,m) is increasing in β, and limβ→∞ h(β, n,m) = 1.
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Fig. 5 Plots of pdf of beta distribution
Hence, when α = 1,the lottery is more efficient than the the waiting-line auc-
tion regardless of the value of β or m/n. This conclusion can be generalized to the
case when α > 1. The intuition here is that, as α increases above 1, the weight
of the pdf shifts to the right. In turn, this means a greater likelihood that indi-
viduals participating in the waiting-line auction possess higher valuations. Thus,
competition intensifies and each individual will raise the optimal waiting time.
Rent-seeking costs are higher; as a result, the h(β, n,m) function decreases in
value as α increases (see Fig. 6). Combining Lemmas 1 and 4, we can conclude
that
Proposition 4 If monetary valuations are drawn from the beta distribution, the
lottery is more efﬁcient than the waiting-line auction, except possibly when α < 1,
β ≥ 1, i.e., when the beta distribution is L-shaped, and m/n is sufﬁciently large.
4 Efficiency comparison: heterogeneous consumers
In Sect. 3, we analyzed the case where time costs are identical. When time costs
vary significantly, it is more appropriate to consider a joint distribution for time
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Fig. 6 Plots of SR/SQ versus m for beta distribution, n = 100 for the first five plots and n = 20
for the last one. The last two plots are based on a few selected points
valuations Y and time costs W (or, equivalently, a joint distribution for monetary
valuation V and time cost W ). When time costs and time valuations are correlated,
it is clear that rent dissipation in the waiting-line auction includes potential resource
misallocation as well. The results for the following special cases are straightfor-
ward: (i) V and W are independent and (ii) Y and W are independent. Using the
general expression derived in (3), some simple conditioning arguments show that
when W is independent of V , all the results of Lemmas 1–4 go through. Again,
using (3), a direct manipulation shows that the SR/SQ function remains the same if
W is no longer constant but is still independent of Y . Therefore, the heterogeneity
in time costs does not affect our results on the relative efficiency of the lottery over
the waiting-line auction if time costs are independent of monetary valuations or
time valuations.
For the general case, we present a model of joint distribution between time
valuations and time costs to analyze the impact of heterogeneity on the relative
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allocative efficiency.12 Our analysis suggests that the relative efficiency of the
waiting-line auction in fact improves when there is positive correlation in time
costs and monetary valuations, and deteriorates when the correlation is negative.
When the correlation is zero, the relative efficiency is not affected by heterogeneity
in time costs.
4.1 Positively correlated time valuation and time cost
Consider the case where Y and W are uniformly distributed on the area A =
{(y, w) : [0 ≤ y ≤ 1], [0 ≤ w ≤ βyβ−1]}. The joint pdf of Y and W is
f (y, w) = 1, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1, 0 ≤ w ≤ βyβ−1; β ≥ 1. (12)
It is easy to verify that fY (y) = βyβ−1, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1, i.e., the marginal distribution
of Y is the power function distribution with the scale parameter equal to 1, and
fW (w) = 1 − (w/β)
1
β−1 , 0 ≤ w ≤ β. The correlation coefficient between Y and
W is
ρ(Y, W ) = β − 1
2β
√
(β + 2)(9β − 6)
7β2 − 2β + 4 .
For β = 1, 2, 4,∞, we have ρ(Y, W ) = 0, 0.32, 0.48, and 0.57, respectively.
This shows that Y and W are uncorrelated when β = 1, and that the correlation
increases as β increases (with an upper limit of 0.57).
Lemma 5 When time valuation Y and time cost W are drawn jointly from the dis-
tribution speciﬁed in (12), the expected social surplus functions are SR = 14mβ,
and SQ = SRh(β, n,m), where,
h(β, n,m)= 2β
2β − 1
(
n
m
− 1
β
+ m + 1
2β(n + 1)−
n!(n − m + 1
β
)
m(n − m − 1)!(n + 1
β
)
)
.
(13)
Furthermore, h(β, n,m) is decreasing in β, h(1, n,m) = m+1
n+1 and limβ→∞
h(β, n,m) = 0.
A comparison of the h functions, defined in Lemmas 1 and 5 allows us to
determine the effect of positive correlation of time costs and valuations on alloca-
tive efficiency. When β = 1, both h functions have the same value. This implies
that when time valuations and time costs are uncorrelated, relative efficiency is
unchanged. Therefore, the results of Proposition 1 continues to hold even if con-
sumers are heterogeneous in their time costs. When β tends to ∞, both h functions
are trivially identical, as both h functions tend to zero.
12 From a modeling point of view, we could consider either a joint distribution of time valuations
and time costs or a joint distribution of monetary valuations and time costs. As our motivation
here is to demonstrate the impact of heterogeneity on relative efficiency, we have chosen the
current specification for its tractability.
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More importantly, as β increases – causing the marginal distribution of time
valuations fY (y) to become more negatively skewed – the waiting-line auction is
less efficient, regardless of the degree of correlation between Y and W . This result
follows directly from Lemma 5, which states that h(β, n,m) ≤ 1 when β = 1
and is decreasing in β. Furthermore, it is straightforward to verify that the relative
efficiency of the lottery increases with β, and decreases with m/n. These results
indicate that the allocative efficiency of the lottery improves when time costs are
positively correlated with time valuations.
4.2 Negatively correlated time valuation and time cost
To analyze the impact of negative correlation on relative efficiency, consider the
following specification of time cost: W ∗ = β − W .13 Then,
ρ(Y, W∗) = −ρ(Y, W ) = −β − 1
2β
√
(β + 2)(9β − 6)
7β2 − 2β + 4 ,
i.e., the time valuation Y and time cost W ∗ are negatively correlated.
Lemma 6 If Y and W follow the joint distribution speciﬁed in (12), the expected
social surplus functions under the time valuation Y and time cost W ∗ = β − W
are SR = 14mβ, and SQ = SRh(β, n,m), where,
h(β, n,m) = 4β
3β − 1h1(β, n,m) −
β + 1
3β − 1h2(β, n,m) (14)
with h1 being the h function deﬁned in Lemma 1 and h2 the h function deﬁned
in Lemma 5. Furthermore, h(β, n,m) is decreasing in β, h(1, n,m) = m+1
n+1 and
limβ→∞ h(β, n,m) = 0.
Together, Lemmas 5 and 6 allow us to compare allocative efficiency under the
alternative scenarios of positive and negative correlations of time costs and time
valuations. We provide graphical analysis, in Fig. 7.
In Fig. 7, we have plotted the three h functions (defined in Lemmas 1, 5 and 6),
against m, for a given value of β and for n = 50. The plots in Fig. 7 show that
when Y and W are positively correlated, the relative efficiency of the waiting-line
auction over the lottery is higher than in the case when Y and W are un-correlated.
The converse is true when Y and W are negatively correlated.14
13 This specification is chosen for its tractability and does not affect the generality of the results
presented here.
14 Note that since monetary valuation is a product of time valuation and time cost, V = Y W , a
positive correlation between Y and W implies a positive correlation between V and W . Similarly,
it is straightforward to show that V and W ∗ are negatively correlated.
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Fig. 7 Plots of the three h functions defined in Lemmas 1, 5 and 6: n = 50
Note that even though the allocative efficiency of the waiting-line auction im-
proves in the case of positive correlation between time costs and time valuations,
the lottery remains the more efficient mechanism (as noted in the discussion fol-
lowing Lemma 5) in the model that we present here. We summarize our findings
below.
Proposition 5 If time valuations Y and time costs W follow the joint distribu-
tion speciﬁed in (12), the allocative efﬁciency of the waiting-line auction improves
(deteriorates) if Y and W are more positively (negatively) correlated, compared
with the case when they are uncorrelated.
A common perception and argument against the use of the waiting-line auction
is that less wealthy with lower monetary valuations are also likely to have lower
time-costs. The assertion is that these individuals are likely to join the queue earlier
in a waiting-line auction, so that the objects are not necessarily allocated to those
who might possess higher monetary valuations. Hence, when time valuations Y and
time costs W are positively correlated, the allocative efficiency of the waiting-line
auction is lower than when time costs are uncorrelated (or negatively correlated)
with time valuations.
Proposition 5 indicates that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the efficiency
of the waiting-line auction in fact improves when time cost is positively correlated
with monetary valuation. In this case, the gain in efficiency here more than off-
sets the costs of waiting in line. In the case of negative correlation, the decline in
the efficiency of the waiting line auction is particularly easy to understand in the
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following example. Suppose all consumers have the same monetary valuations of
the good. Then time costs and time valuations are negatively correlated. In this
case, since everyone values the good identically, so that the queuing costs have no
offsetting benefit in terms of allocative efficiency.
5 Conclusion
By comparing the expected social surplus functions of the two allocation mech-
anisms, we are able to delineate the circumstances under which a lottery is more
efficient than the waiting-line auction, and vice versa. Our analysis suggests that
when time costs are homogeneous, random allocation is the optimal mechanism
in a wide range of circumstances (Propositions 1 to 4). We show that the relative
efficiency of the waiting-line auction improves when there is positive correlation
between time costs and time valuations, but deteriorates when the correlation is
negative (Proposition 5).
Our results indicate that besides its equity appeal, the lottery is also the efﬁcient
non-price allocation mechanism in a wide variety of situations. Although heteroge-
neity in time costs may improve the relative efficiency of the waiting-line auction
when there there is positive correlation with time valuations, our study shows that
the improvement is not likely to be significant enough to reverse the efficiency
ranking in most situations, unless the marginal distribution of time valuation is
extremely positively skewed (i.e. L-shaped).
While the analysis in this paper is positive and does not address the issue of
equity, we hope the results presented here will contribute to a better understanding
among policy-makers on the choice of the appropriate non-price allocation mech-
anism. Clearly, if more weight is assigned to the welfare (expected payoffs) of a
particular group of individuals, the relative desirability of two allocation schemes
may not follow the ranking based on allocative efficiency. Specifically, it is con-
ceivable that if it is desirable that the allocation favors, say, the lower-income
group, and time costs and positively correlated with time valuation, then a waiting-
line auction may be the preferred allocation scheme. However, a potentially better
allocation scheme may be to segregate the n participants into two or more groups,
based on income, and conduct separate lotteries for the different groups. Relatively
more of the m objects could be alloted to the lower-income group. This meets the
objective of favoring the lower-income group, without incurring rent-seeking costs
of waiting in line.
Appendix: Proofs of the Lemmas
The proofs of Lemmas 1–4 are basically the derivations of SQ give in (4) in terms
of money valuation V . That is,
SQ = n
n−1∑
k = n−m
(
n − 1
k
) v∫
v
FV (v)k[1 − FV (v)]n−kdv.
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Proof of Lemma 1 With the power function distribution, we have FV (v)= (v/θ)β ,
and
SR = mE(V ) = mθβ
1 + β
SQ = n
n−1∑
k = n−m
(
n − 1
k
) θ∫
0
[(v/θ)β)]k[1 − (v/θ)β ]n−kdv
= n
n−1∑
k = n−m
(
n − 1
k
)
θ
β
1∫
0
u
k+ 1
β
−1
(1 − u)n−kdu, (by letting u = (v/θ)β)
= n
n−1∑
k = n−m
(
n − 1
k
)
θ
β
(k + 1
β
)(n − k + 1)
(n + 1 + 1
β
)
= θ
β
(n + 1)
(n + 1 + 1
β
)
n−1∑
k = n−m
(k + 1
β
)
k! (n − k)
= θ
β
(n + 1)
(n + 1 + 1
β
)
(
β2(n + 1 + 1
β
)
(1 + β)(n) −
β(βn + m + 1)(n − m + 1
β
)
(1 + β)(n − m)
)
= mθβ
1 + β
(
n
m
− n!(βn + m + 1)(n − m +
1
β
)
βm(n − m − 1)!(n + 1 + 1
β
)
)
.
It is straightforward to verify the properties of the h function stated in the Lemma.
Proof of Lemma 2 With the Weibull distribution, we have FV (v) = 1 −
exp [−(v/θ)β ], and
SR = mE(V ) = mθ
(
1 + 1
β
)
SQ = n
n−1∑
k = n−m
(
n − 1
k
) ∞∫
0
[1 − exp(−(v/θ)β)]k[exp(−v/θ)β ]n−kdv.
Making a change of variable u = (v/θ)β , and then applying the binominal expan-
sion to [1 − exp(−u)]k , the integral in the summation for SQ becomes
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∫ ∞
0
[1 − exp(−(v/θ)β)]k[exp(−v/θ)β ]n−kdv
= θ
β
∞∫
0
u1/β−1[1 − exp(−u)]k[exp(−u)]n−kdu
= θ
β
∞∫
0
u1/β−1


k∑
j = 0
(
k
j
)
(−1) j exp(− ju)

 [exp(−(n − k)u)]du
= θ
β
∞∫
0
u1/β−1


k∑
j = 0
(
k
j
)
(−1) j exp(−(n − k + j)u)

 du
= θ
β
k∑
j = 0
(
k
j
)
(−1) j
∞∫
0
u1/β−1 exp[−(n − k + j)u]du
= θ
β
k∑
j = 0
(
k
j
)
(−1) j(1/β)
(
1
n − k + j
)1/β
.
Substituting this back into the expression for SQ , we have
SQ = n θ
β
n−1∑
k = n−m
(
n − 1
k
) k∑
j = 0
(
k
j
)
(−1) j(1/β)
(
1
n − k + j
)1/β
= nθ(1 + 1/β)
n−1∑
k = n−m
k∑
j = 0
(
n − 1
k
)(
k
j
)
(−1) j
(
1
n − k + j
)1/β
= mθ(1 + 1/β)h(β, n,m).
Since 1/(n−k+ j) ≤ 1 with equality occurring only when k = n−1, and j = 0,
the terms in the summation of h(β, n,m) are thus either constant or increasing in
β. Hence h is an increasing function of β. Finally,
h(1, n,m) = n
m
n−1∑
k = n−m
(
n − 1
k
) k∑
j = 0
(
k
j
)
(−1) j
(
1
n − k + j
)
= n
m
n−1∑
k = n−m
(
n − 1
k
)
k!
(n − k)(n − k + 1) · · · (n − 1)n
= n
m
n−1∑
k = n−m
1
n
= 1.
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Note that the first summation is handled by a combinatory formula
k∑
j = 0
(
k
j
)
(−1) j
a + j =
k!
a(a + 1) · · · (a + k) , for a = 0,−1,−2, . . . ,−k.
Proof of Lemma 3 With the logistic distribution, we have
SR = mE(V ) = mµ
∞∫
−∞
FV (v)k[1 − FV (v)]n−kdv
=
∞∫
−∞
[
1 − 1
1 + exp((v − µ)/θ)
]k [ 1
1 + exp((v − µ)/θ)
]n−k
dv.
Letting w = {1 + exp[(v − µ)/θ ]}−1, the above integral becomes
1∫
0
(1 − w)kwn−k θ
w(1 − w)dw
= θ
1∫
0
(1 − w)k−1wn−k−1dw
= θ (k)(n − k)
(n)
This gives
SQ = n
n−1∑
k = n−m
(
n − 1
k
)
θ(k)(n − k)
(n)
= nθ
n−1∑
k = n−m
(n − 1)!
k!(n − k − 1)!
(k − 1)!(n − k − 1)!
(n−)!
= nθ
n−1∑
k = n−m
1
k
= nθ [(n) − (n − m)].
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Proof of Lemma 4 When α = 1, the beta distribution becomes FV (v) = 1 −
(1 − v)β . This gives
SR = mE(V ) = m
1 + β
SQ = n
n−1∑
k = n−m
(
n − 1
k
) 1∫
0
[1 − (1 − v)β ]k(1 − v)β(n−k)dv
= n
n−1∑
k = n−m
(
n − 1
k
)
1
β
(n − k + 1
β
)
(n + 1 + 1
β
)
= n!
β(n + 1 + 1
β
)
n−1∑
k = n−m
(n − k + 1
β
)
(n − k)
= n!
β(n + 1 + 1
β
)
β(m + 1 + 1
β
)
(1 + β)(m) , (by Mahthematica)
= m
1 + β
n!(m + 1 + 1
β
)
m!(n + 1 + 1
β
)
The rest of the proof is straightforward.
Proof of Lemma 5
SQ = nE

W
Y∫
0
H QY (x)dx


= n
1∫
0
βyβ−1∫
0
w


y∫
0
H QY (x)dx

 f (y, w)dwdy
= n
1∫
0


y∫
0
H QY (x)dx

 1
2
β2y2(β−1)dy
= nβ
2
2
1∫
0


1∫
x
y2(β−1)dy

 H QY (x)dx
= nβ
2
2(2β − 1)
1∫
0
(1 − x2β−1)H QY (x)dx
= nβ
2
2(2β − 1)
n−1∑
k = n−m
(
n − 1
k
)
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×
1∫
0
(1 − x2β−1)(xβ)k(1 − xβ)n−k−1dx, (letting u = xβ)
= nβ
2(2β − 1)
n−1∑
k = n−m
(
n − 1
k
)
×


1∫
0
u
k+ 1
β
−1(1−u)n−k−1 −
1∫
0
uk+1(1 − u)n−k−1

 du
= nβ
2(2β − 1)
n−1∑
k = n−m
(
n − 1
k
)(
(k + 1
β
)(n − k)
(n + 1
β
)
− (k + 2)(n − k)
(n + 2)
)
= β
2(2β − 1)
n−1∑
k = n−m
(
(n + 1)(k + 1
β
)
(n + 1
β
)(k + 1) −
k + 1
n + 1
)
= β
2(2β − 1)
(
(n + 1)
(n + 1
β
)
(
β(n + 1
β
)
(n)
− β(n − m +
1
β
)
(n − m)
)
−m(n + 1) −
1
2m(m + 1)
n + 1
)
=
(
mβ
4
)
2β
2β − 1
(
n
m
− 1
β
+ m + 1
2β(n + 1) −
n!(n − m + 1
β
)
m(n − m − 1)!(n + 1
β
)
)
#
It is then straightforward to verify the properties of the h function stated in the
Lemma.
Proof of Lemma 6
SQ = nE

W ∗
Y∫
0
H QY (x)dx

 = nE

(β − W )
Y∫
0
H QY (x)dx


= nβE


Y∫
0
H QY (x)dx

 − nE

W
Y∫
0
H QY (x)dx


The first part can be obtained from Lemma 1 and the second part can be obtained
from Lemma 5.
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